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I. INTRODUCTION
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,' the United States
Supreme Court provided an additional ray of hope to the proponents of
wholesale educational reform when it held that a state-paid sign lan-
Copyright held by the NEBRAsKA LAw REVIEW.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
guage interpreter furnished to a student in a pervasively sectarian
school is not prohibited by the Establishment Clause.2 While the deci-
sion of the Court does little to clear the murky waters of contemporary
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Zobrest has definitive implica-
tions for the constitutionality of education vouchers and school choice.
Symbolically, Zobrest is a paradigmatic expression of the struggle be-
tween the autocracy of public education and parents seeking to ex-
pand their childrens' educational opportunities.
This Note first examines the factual background and procedural
history of Zobrest and includes a brief summary of Establishment
Clause theory. Next, the Note analyzes the legal underpinnings of
Zobrest in terms of prior case law developing the parameters of the
Establishment Clause as applied to religious and sectarian education.
From a First Amendment perspective, this Note determines the
Court's decision is exceptionally narrow in scope and leaves intact
nearly five decades of secularist Religion Clause doctrine. Nonethe-
less, the Note concludes that irrespective of Zobrest's de minimis im-
pact on the contours of the Establishment Clause, the ramifications of
Zobrest in the domain of educational choice, tuition tax-credits, and
education vouchers are substantial.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1988, Larry and Sandra Zobrest contemplated enrolling their
son James at Salpointe Catholic High School in Tucson, Arizona.3
Salpointe is unabashedly a school where Catholic orthodoxy is the or-
der of the day and secular instruction is not divorced from the inculca-
tion of religious values. The faculty at Salpointe is encouraged to
manifest to the students the "presence of God... in nature, human
history,.., and other secular areas of the curriculum."4 Students are
also required to attend classes in Religion, and although not
mandatory, attendance at daily Mass is viewed with approbation by
school administrators. To Larry and Sandra Zobrest, this was the ed-
ucation they deemed best for their son. Although James Zobrest was
deaf, they did not foresee his handicap as an impediment to attending
Salpointe. From their perspective, James would be entitled to a sign
language interpreter in accordance with the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act (IDEA)5 irrespective of their choice of school. IDEA
was enacted by Congress for the express purpose of assisting "[sltates
and localities to provide for the education of all children with disabili-
ties .... 6 Furthermore, the State of Arizona, as a recipient of federal
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2464.
4. Id. at 2472.
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. Id. § 1400(c)(emphasis added).
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funds under IDEA, enacted its own statutory scheme7 whereby handi-
capped children in private and public schools receive educational serv-
ices designed to facilitate their education.
Several months prior to James' enrollment at Salpointe, the
Zobrests petitioned the Catalina Foothills School District for a sign
language interpreter to assist James in his classes. Acting on the
legal advice of the Pima County Attorney, the school district refused
the Zobrests' request.S The district claimed the provision of a sign
language interpreter at Salpointe would be tantamount to the estab-
lishment of religion and a breach of both the Arizona and United
States Constitutions.9 In accordance with the relevant provisions of
IDEA, the Zobrests filed suit in federal district court seeking a prelim-
inary injunction requiring the district to provide the interpreter.' 0
The court denied the Zobrests' request for injunctive relief and
granted summary judgment to the school district stating "[t]he inter-
preter would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of James...
at government expense.... That kind of entanglement of church and
state ... is not allowed.""
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the prevailing Establishment
Clause test promulgated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'2 According to the
three pronged Lemon test, a statute will withstand scrutiny under an
Establishment Clause challenge if (1) it has a secular legislative pur-
pose, (2) its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
(3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement between government
and religion.i3 Affirming summary judgment in a divided 2-1 vote,
the Ninth Circuit agreed IDEA has a secular legislative purpose,' 4 but
determined that "IDEA, if applied as [the Zobrests] proposed, would
have the primary effect of advancing religion and thus would run afoul
of the Establishment Clause."' 5 But perhaps the most quixotic aspect
of the opinion was the court's admission that although "denial of aid to
the Zobrests does impose a burden on their free exercise rights ...
[t]he government has a compelling interest in ensuring the Establish-
ment Clause is not violated."16 Thus, as a matter of constitutional
7. ARiz. REv. STATo ANN. §§ 15-761 to 15-772 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
8. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2464 (1993).
9. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1192 (1992), rev'd, 113 S.
Ct. 2462 (1993). See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 12.
10. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2464 (1993).
11. Id.
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
13. Id. at 612-13.
14. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2464-65 (1992).
15. Id. at 2465.
16. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1992),
rev'd 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
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law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Free Exercise Clause
is subordinate to the Establishment Clause.
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 mar-
gin, held that providing James Zobrest a sign language interpreter
would not violate the Establishment Clause.17 The Court substan-
tially mirrored the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Tang, and con-
cluded that a sign language interpreter provided under IDEA is a
general welfare benefit available to all handicapped children and is
not analogous to a form of direct government assistance to religion.18
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Court did not engage in an overt appli-
cation of the Lemon test. However, in the two principal cases cited by
Justice Rehnquist, Mueller v. Allen 19 and Witters v. Washington De-
partment of Services for the Blind,20 the Lemon test was directly ap-
plied. Thus, in a tangential manner, Lemon affected the outcome of
the decision.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun first chided the majority
for their lack of judicial restraint in exercising jurisdiction over a case
that according to Blackmun, should have been remanded "for consid-
eration of the statutory and regulatory issues."21 It did not matter to
the dissenters that these issues were not raised at the trial court level
or to the court of appeals. For in its Supreme Court brief, the Catalina
Foothills School District, for the first time, asserted that IDEA "does
not require it to furnish [James Zobrest] with an interpreter.., so
long as [one is] made available at a public school."22 Additionally, the
district maintained that under IDEA, the government is expressly
prohibited from paying for services that facilitate "[r]eligious worship,
instruction, or proselytization.23 Quoting a plethora of cases stand-
ing for the proposition that the Supreme Court should avoid constitu-
tional questions unless absolutely necessary,24 all four dissenters
were resolute in contending the Court should vacate and remand.25
On Establishment Clause grounds, only Justices Souter and Black-
mun argued that a state-paid sign language interpreter at Salpointe
would be unconstitutional, relying primarily upon the case of Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball.26 Interestingly the dissent, like the
17. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993).
18. Id. at 2468-69.
19. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
20. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
21. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2470 (1993)(Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2465.
23. Id. at 2465 n.7 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 76.532(a)(1)(1992)).
24. Id. at 2470.
25. Although O'Connor and Stevens did not concur with Part H of Blackmun's dis-
sent, they agreed the case should have been remanded "for consideration of the
various threshold problems... " Id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
26. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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majority, did not ground its analysis of Zobrest expressly in terms of
the three part Lemon test. In fact, Blackmun made reference to
Lemon only once.2 7
III. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT THEORY
To glean a better understanding of Zobrest and its narrow impact
on the freedom of religion, it is necessary to briefly examine the histor-
ical development of modern Establishment Clause doctrine. During
the last forty years the Supreme Court has structured its Religion
Clause analysis around the separationist jurisprudence championed
by Justices Black, Brennan, and as seen in Zobrest, Blackmun.2 S
While the secularist view has certainly been predominate, more re-
cently, under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, conservatives
on the Court are looking to fashion a less hostile relationship between
government and religion.29 First and foremost among their objectives
is to jettison the Lemon test, the bedrock of strict separationism. 30
Yet as Zobrest so aptly demonstrates, efforts to formulate a more ami-
cable relationship between government and religion have been elusive
at best.
A. The Incorporation of Secularism
The genesis of contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education.31 Everson made
the Establishment Clause applicable to the states by incorporating it
into the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. 32 In Ev-
erson, the Court fashioned an avant-garde interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause which inter alia, "requires the state to be neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers."3 3
27. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2473 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
28. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REv.
115, 121-22 (1992)(documenting the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of Jus-
tices Black and Brennan and their influential role in directing the Court to
"evince a suspicion of religion").
29. During oral argument in Zobrest, the Chief Justice, in a friendly exchange with
Justice White, urged, "[lit's time we tried to straighten [this] out," referring to the
Establishment Clause chaos produced by the Lemon test; to which the latter re-
sponded, "Be careful." Jeffrey Rosen, Lemon Law: Court Watch, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 17.
30. As to why the Court in Zobrest did not explicitly overrule Lemon, at least one
Court observer speculated that because Justice White had "one foot out the door,"
he was reluctant to alter Lemon, and such a task would be better left to his re-
placement, Ruth Ginsburg. Max Boot, Supreme Court Extends Scope of Religious
Rights, CMUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 21, 1993, at 6.
31. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id. at 18.
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More succinctly put, Everson went beyond the traditional notion that
government is prohibited from favoring one religion over another by
holding the Establishment Clause mandates government neutrality
between religion and irreligion as well.3 4 Before Everson, the states
were free to formulate more provincial rules regarding church-state
relations, uninhibited by the constraints of the First Amendment. For
non-preferentialists, 3 5 the insidious aspect of incorporation was not
incorporation in a procedural sense, but rather the secularist perspec-
tive on the Establishment Clause ensconced within the doctrine. And
while no reasonable First Amendment academic would seriously ar-
gue for the repeal of incorporation, it is the substantive component of
incorporation that has profoundly affected Establishment Clause
theory.
Essentially, the Establishment Clause jurisprudence made appli-
cable to the states in Everson is grounded exclusively on the Court's de
facto constitutionalization of Jefferson's savorless metaphor the "wall
of separation between church and state.36 Nowhere is this more self-
evident than in the last paragraph of Justice Black's majority opinion:
"The First Amendment has erected a wall of separation between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach."37 Viewed in the context of
this singular paragraph, it is much easier to see how the Court in Ev-
erson could promulgate an interpretation of the Establishment Clause
which proscribes the passage of laws "which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."38
The weak link in this intellectual chain is the faulty historical
premise that Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in
which the metaphorical "wall of separation" was first erected, provides
the authoritative constitutional exegesis of the Establishment
Clause.39 The intrinsic problem with the "wall" theory is two-fold: (1)
it erroneously assumes Jefferson's expansive role in the formulation
and adoption of the Religion Clauses in the Bill of Rights, and (2) it
34. Id.
35. Non-preferentialists argue the Establishment Clause merely prevents the federal
government from establishing a national religion and that non-discriminatory aid
to religion is consistent with the framers' intent. The primary spokesman for
non-preferentialism, Chief Justice Rehnquist, would be more willing to defer to
the legislative will in the area of church-state relations.
36. Wallace v. Jaffre, 472 U.S. 38, 92-93 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
37. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
38. Id. at 15.
39. See generally Wallace v. Jaifre, 472 U.S. 38, 91-100 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing)(providing an excellent overview of the role that Jefferson actually played in
the formulation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment).
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ignores the Madisonian perspective on the purpose and meaning of
the Establishment Clause.40
It seems indisputable from... Madison's thinking, as reflected by actions on
the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the [First] Amendment as designed
to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent
discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the
part of government between religion and irreligion. Thus the Court's opinion
in Everson-while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson together in
their exertions in their home State leading to the enactment of the Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty-is totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison
carried these [Jefferson's] views onto the floor of the United States House of
Representatives when he proposed the language which would ultimately be-
come the Bill of Rights.4 1
As Justice Rehnquist correctly points out, when the Court in Everson
merged the constitutional contributions of Madison and Jefferson into
-an amalgam of church-state separationism, it betrayed an accurate
historical interpretation of the Establishment Clause.42
B. The Birth of the Lemon Test
In School District v. Schempp,4 3 the Supreme Court added to the
foundation of Everson when it struck down a Pennsylvania statute
which permitted students to read from The Holy Bible as part of their
daily classroom activities. 44 As a harbinger to the Lemon test,
Schempp employed a "purpose" and "primary effect" analysis identical
to the "purpose" and "primary effect" prongs that would be articulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman45 eight years later: "The test may be stated as
follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?
... [T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."46
Not surprisingly, the Court's decision to invalidate the Penn-
sylvania statute relied upon the thematic underpinnings of Everson-
namely, that Jefferson and Madison shared indistinguishable posi-
tions on the meaning of the Establishment Clause and therefore, gov-
ernment is compelled by the Constitution to maintain a posture of
40. Two noted First Amendment scholars contend that Justice Black's sense of Amer-
ican History was certainly jaded toward a Jeffersonian perspective on the Estab-
lishment Clause. While correctly characterizing the positions espoused by
Jefferson, Black missed the historical mark with respect to giving an accurate
portrayal of Madison's views. See JoHN H. GARVEY AND FREDRICK ScIAuEI, THE
FiRST AMENDmE Nr: A READER 367 (1992).
41. Wallace v. Jaffre, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 106.
43. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44. Id. at 205.
45. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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"wholesome neutrality" between religion and secularism.47 Yet, as
Justice Stewart cogently points out in his dissenting opinion, when
the power of the state is juxtaposed between religion on the one hand
and secularism on the other, "religion is placed at an artificial and
state-created disadvantage."48
In terms of the purpose and primary effect prongs enunciated in
Schempp, their mechanistic application is designed to yield results
consistent with Everson's historically suspect premise that govern-
ment is proscribed from aiding religion. Ironically, in its effort to en-
force a constitutional neutrality between state action and religion, the
Court has achieved results inapposite to that goal. Instead the out-
come is the "establishment of a religion of secularism, or at the least,
government support of the beliefs of those who think that religious
exercises should be conducted only in private."49
The Lemon test as originally articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,50
was merely the culmination of previous Establishment Clause case
law having a theoretical basis in an extreme form of church-state sep-
aratism. Like its predecessors in Everson and Schempp, the Court in
Lemon began its inquiry with an acknowledgement, in almost apolo-
getic terms, that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment possess
nearly metaphysical qualities, thereby reducing the expectations for a
decision grounded in sound jurisprudence.5 ' Unfortunately, such
prefatory language only weakens the legal import of the Court's deci-
sion and provides credibility to claims questioning the constitutional
workability of the Lemon test.
In applying the purpose prong from Schempp to a pair of Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania statutes, the Court in Lemon discovered a
secular legislative purpose whereby state tax dollars were expended to
augment the salaries of teachers in non-public schools. The statutes'
explicitly stated goals were to "enhance the quality of the secular edu-
cation in all schools covered by the compulsory, attendance laws."5 2
Simply because the legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
outwardly articulated a secular purpose behind these laws and
seemed sincere, the purpose prong was satisfied. As for the second
prong, the Court in Lemon withheld judgment as to whether the pri-
mary effect of the two statutes advanced religion in a manner violative
of the Establishment Clause, opting instead to void the statutes on
entanglement grounds.53
47. Id. at 213-14.
48. Id. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. See id. at 612.
52. Id. at 613.
53. Id. at 613-14.
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The entanglement prong of the Lemon test, borrowed from Walz v.
Tax Commission,5 4 provided the legal impetus for invalidating the
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes.5 5 According to the Court,
the logic of Walz, which was used to uphold the constitutionality of
property tax exemptions for religious organizations, was equally ap-
plicable to the facts in Lemon.56 The essence of the entanglement
prong as applied in Walz and later in Lemon insures that the net effect
of legislation is not an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion and vice versa.
The Court's opinion in Lemon defined "entanglement" in terms of
the necessity of preventing "the danger that a teacher under religious
control and discipline poses" to the desired goal of church-state sepa-
ration.5 7 To make the entanglement prong seem less hostile to reli-
gion, the Court envisioned a scenario where the entanglement prong
would protect religion. For example, in order to avoid the "danger" of
a teacher in a sectarian school, who, for instance, teaches a secular
subject such as mathematics or typing, from inculcating the students
with faith or morality, it would be necessary for the government to
impose a system of state surveillance in the classroom "to insure that
... restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise [is]
respected."58 Such government intrusion would itself involve an ex-
cessive entanglement between church and state and thus run afoul of
the Establishment Clause.
Lemon's entanglement prong is not without its critics. 59 For in-
stance, it is nearly impossible to expunge religion from all aspects of
public life. Therefore, tests that call for an examination of the interre-
lationship between government and religion exclusively in secular
54. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
55. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-24 (1971).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 617. The question of who really poses a "danger" was addressed by Justice
Scalia during oral argument in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), where the state of New York tried to prevent
a church from having access to school facilities during after-school hours. In his
intellectual dissection of a brief filed by the New York State Attorney General,
Scalia took issue with the assertion that religion "yields a benefit only to those
who already believe" by asking State Attorney John Hoefling the following ques-
tion: "It used to be believed that a God-fearing person was less likely to mug me
and rape my sister. I guess that's not the view anymore. Has this new regime
worked very well?" Timothy M. Phelps, Where to Separate the Church, State?
High Court Weighs Right of LI Congregation to Use School, NEWSDAY, Feb. 25,
1993, at 4.
58. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971).
59. In his dissenting opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Justice White characterizes the
majority's entanglement analysis as a "curious and mystifying blend." Id. at 666.
See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985)(O'Connor, J., dissenting)("To
a great extent, the anomalous results in our Establishment Clause cases are 'at-
tributable to [the] entanglement prong.' ")(citation omitted).
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terms will invariably prejudice sectarian interests.60 For if the Con-
stitution presumes that government and religion cannot intersect
within the same domain, then the absence of religion, or secularism, is
the only permissible result. Chief Justice Rehnquist considers the en-
tanglement component limited to the facts of Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion,61 and "that when divorced from the logic of Walz, it creates an
'insoluble paradox.'-62 Furthermore, the special property tax exemp-
tion for religious institutions is well grounded in the 200 years of
American history.63 Admittedly, entanglement analysis worked well
within the historical structure of Walz, but to formulate a rule of law
outside of its historical context reminds one of Oliver Wendell Holmes'
revelation, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."64
C. Zobrest: The Opportunity to Reconsider Lemon
Because the Lemon test is part and parcel of an Establishment
Clause doctrine which rests exclusively on the historically misplaced
metaphor, "wall of separation between church and state," its applica-
tion will more often than not yield inconsistent results.65 Still, the
Supreme Court has delayed fashioning an interpretation of the First
Amendment more accommodating to religion. This is due in part to
stare decisis and the difficulty of reaching a consensus among the jus-
tices who are critical of the secularist doctrine inherent in Lemon.66
For example, in Lee v. Weisman,67 a school prayer case decided in
1992, the anti-Lemon forces could only produce a stinging dissent from
Justice Scalia and were at least one vote short of explicitly overturn-
ing Lemon.68  Nonetheless, when the Court granted certiorari in
60. See McConnell, supra note 28, at 129-30. While generally critical of the Lemon
test, McConnell represents the "religious accomodationist7 wing in the current
debate on church-state relations. Although the accomodationists eschew the sec-
ularist Establishment Clause'jurisprudence of the last fifty years, neither are
they willing to adopt the religious majoritarianism advocated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
61. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
62. Wallace v. Jaffre, 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1971)(White, J., dissenting).
63. See Walz v. Tax Conm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 677-80 (1970).
64. Id. at 675-76 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988)(describing the entangle-
ment prong as a "Catch-22").
65. See Wallace v. Jaffre, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), for a
non-exhaustive catalogue of the wildly contradictory results produced by the
Lemon test.
66. Zobrest is an excellent example of how the justices' general dissatisfaction with
the Lemon test does not necessarily translate into a unified approach to interpret-
ing the Establishment Clause.
67. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
68. Justice Kennedy's coercion test, first articulated in County of Allegheny v. ACLU
492 U.S. 573 (1989), could only muster a bare plurality in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
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Zobrest,69 some commentators seemed to think the case would provide
another opportunity to bring certainty to an area of law wrought with
judicial vacillation. 70
Despite the Court's narrow holding, Zobrest is a useful paradigm of
the tension between the secularist underpinnings of Lemon and the
desire of non-preferentialists to reshape the course of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. The legal process in Zobrest illustrates this
philosophical conflict and the problematic application of Lemon as
well. To support its legal conclusion in Zobrest, the majority utilizes
four cases in which the Court rendered a favorable result to religious
interests.71 Likewise, the dissent in Zobrest employs four Establish-
ment Clause cases where government aid to religion was held uncon-
stitutional.72 Besides the fact that all eight cases were decided within
a relatively close time frame,73 the common denominator in the eight
cases is the application of the Lemon test. Herein lies the gravamen of
the dilemma. All eight cases concerned the intersection between reli-
gion, government, and education, yet the finest of lines must be drawn
to distinguish the outcome of each case. The end result becomes the
paramount objective.74 Thus, Zobrest and future Establishment
Clause cases may be reduced to which faction of the Court commands
Ct. 2649 (1992). Had Kennedy concluded the graduation prayer in Weisman was
not coercive, it is quite plausible that Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, and
White might have joined with Kennedy in replacing the Lemon test with Ken-
nedy's coercion test.
69. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
70. The Boston Globe speculated that "the present Supreme Court may be inclined
[in Zobrest] to modify-or even overturn-the [Lemon] test." Arguing Church-
State Relations, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1993, at 16. Christianity Today ob-
served Zobrest "could afford the high court an opportunity to provide new defini-
tions for proper church and state boundaries." Establishment Clause Issues
Examined, CusTmYrrv TODAY, April 5, 1993, at 71. See also Rosen, supra note
29, at 17 (stating Zobrest gives the Court 'the opportunity to cut the Gordian knot
by replacing Lemon .... ").
71. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
72. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975). Although the Court in Wolman upheld aid to religious schools in
the form of textbooks and diagnostic services, in the same opinion, the Court also
struck down certain instructional materials and bus transportation for field trips
as unconstitutional.
73. The Court decided Meek in 1975 and Bowen in 1988, a 13-year span.
74. Constitutional adjudication that is result driven has a de-stabilizing effect on the
composition of the law. As Judge Bork observed, "[i]f you do not care about stabil-
ity, if today's result is all-important, there is no occasion to respect either the
constitutional text or the decisions of your predecessors." ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTiNG OF AmERIcA 159 (1990).
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a majority and can most deftly fit the facts of a particular case into the
uncertain contours of prevailing Establishment Clause principles.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ZOBREST
A. The Establishment Clause Does Not Prohibit Religious
Organizations from Receiving Government Benefits
The underlying proposition advanced by the Court in Zobrest dis-
pelled the notion that institutions having a religious character are a
fortiori prohibited from receiving government assistance.75 Although
it is undisputed that the sign language interpreter provided to James
Zobrest inhered an indirect government benefit to Salpointe Catholic
High School, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Establishment
Clause cannot be construed to impose an absolute bar on the flow of
government benefits to religious organizations. 76 If such were the
case, then "a church could not be protected by the police and fire de-
partments, or have its public sidewalks kept in repair."7 7 However,
the question remains: At what point does government assistance to a
pervasively religious organization work a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause? At first blush, the answer to this question may seem
unclear, primarily because Zobrest was decided with only a thinly
veiled analysis in terms of the Lemon test.78 Nevertheless, the prece-
dential value of Zobrest transcends Lemon. The principles derived
from Zobrest are consistent with the Establishment Clause irrespec-
tive of the continued viability of the Lemon test or any other test the
Court generates.
The prevailing proposition announced in Zobrest, that the First
Amendment does not preclude "religious institutions ... from partici-
pating in publically sponsored social welfare programs," 79 is a funda-
mental tenet of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As far back as
1899, the Supreme Court held in Bradfield v. RobertsSO that a feder-
ally financed contract for the construction of a building at a Roman
Catholic hospital was not inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause.8 1 In so holding, the Court in Bradfield reasoned that merely
75. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
76. Id. at 2466.
77. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981)).
78. Zobrest is similar to Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting)
and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in that the Lemon test was either
completely ignored or not determinative to the decision. In fact, Lemon is men-
tioned only once in the majority opinion in Zobrest and only in terms of explain-
ing the holding of the Ninth Circuit. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.
113 S. Ct. 2462, 2464-65 (1993).
79. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993)(quoting
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988)).
80. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
81. Id. at 295-96.
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because the hospital operated under the supervision of the Catholic
church, this did not change the predominately secular purpose of the
hospital-to provide medical care and treatment.8 2
Nearly 100 years later, in Bowen v. Kendrick,83 the Court upheld
as facially valid, provisions of the Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981
(AFLA).84 In relevant part, AFLA dispensed federal funds to public or
private organizations and agencies for "services and research in the
area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy."85 Yet,
because some religiously-oriented organizations were successful in
procuring federal grants in accordance with AFLA, several groups
filed suit, claiming AFLA violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.86 Reviewing the legislative history of AFLA, the
Court determined Congress did not expressly prohibit religious orga-
nizations from obtaining grants under AFLA.87 Furthermore, the
Court proclaimed its disapprobation with the view that religion can
never be the recipient of government funds:88 "We note... this Court
has never held that religious institutions are disabled by the First
Amendment from participating in publically sponsored social welfare
programs."89
Like AFLA, IDEA is a government sponsored welfare program.90
Therefore, when the Catalina Foothills School District denied a sign
language interpreter to James Zobrest, it was legally insufficient for
the district to simply contend that Salpointe's receipt of government
assistance via IDEA would be a per se violation of the Establishment
Clause. To underscore this point, the Supreme Court in Zobrest cor-
rectly observed that "government programs that neutrally provide
benefits.., without reference to religion are not readily subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions
may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."91
82. Id. at 298.
83. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
84. Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
85. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,593 (1988)(quoting S. REP. No. 161, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1981)).
86. Id. at 597.
87. Id. at 604 n.9.
88. A plenitude of Supreme Court decisions in the last fifty years support the general
contention that government aid to religion does not represent a per se violation of
the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 387 (1983); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736 (1976); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
89. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988).
90. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
91. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993).
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B. Government Benefits Provided in Accordance with IDEA
Are Available to All Parents of Handicapped
Children Irrespective of Religious Affiliation
When the benefits of a government program are available to indi-
viduals irrespective of religious affiliation, such a program will with-
stand the scrutiny of an Establishment Clause challenge.92 In
Zobrest, the educational services rendered to the parents of James
Zobrest were disseminated using the handicap of the student as the
sole criteria for determining benefit eligibility under IDEA.93 Accord-
ingly, the Court reasoned that this factor was "an important index of
[IDEA's] secular effect."94 Zobrest is thus consistent with a line of
case law articulating "neutral application" as the sine qua non of gov-
ernment benefit programs having the ancillary effect of aiding
religion.
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist,95 the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a series of New
York statutes authorizing the expenditure of public funds for private
elementary and secondary schools.96 Because the benefits under the
New York statute flowed exclusively to children attending private and
primarily sectarian schools, the program was prima facie invalid.97
Nevertheless, the Court suggested in dicta that if the program had
been restructured to include all school children, both public and pri-
vate, the program would have passed constitutional muster.98
Similarly, in Widmar v. Vincent,99 the Court upheld an Eighth Cir-
cuit decision involving a student religious group's right to equal access
to university facilities. 00 When the University of Missouri at Kansas
City passed a regulation excluding religious organizations from the
use of university buildings "for purposes of religious worship or reli-
gious teaching,"101 several students brought suit seeking to enjoin en-
forcement of the regulation. The Supreme Court, in Widmar, held
that a university policy of equal access permitting an almost unlim-
ited range of groups access to university facilities does not violate the
Establishment Clause.102 In Widmar, students were seeking equal
access to a neutrally provided government benefit, a benefit not con-
92. Id. at 2466.
93. Id. at 2467. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a)(1)(1988 & Supp. IV.).
94. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467 (quoting Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
95. 413 U.S. 756 (1977).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 782 n.38.
99. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 265.
102. Id. at 276-77.
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ceptually dissimilar from those provided in Bowen and Zobrest.
Again, the touchstone for the decision was the broad class of govern-
ment beneficiaries.
The provisions of IDEA cut across all ideological and religious
boundaries, in that to qualify for educational benefits, the only consid-
eration is the handicap of the child.103 Essentially, IDEA can be clas-
sified as a "government program that distributes benefits neutrally to
any child qualifying as 'handicapped'... without regard to the 'sectar-
ian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child
attends."'0 4 James Zobrest qualified for a sign language interpreter
because he is profoundly deaf and for no other reason. Similarly, a
student who is blind and attends a public school would be entitled to
read Pilgrim's Progress in braille solely because of his blindness.
Whether the school is public or private is simply irrelevant.
The Court's reliance on Mueller v. AllenlO5 adds additional support
to the central argument advanced in Zobrest that the neutral applica-
tion of welfare benefits to a broad class of beneficiaries does not trans-
gress the First Amendment.106 In Mueller, a Minnesota law
permitting the parents of all school children to deduct educational ex-
penses from gross income was upheld as constitutional. O7 Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Mueller is a fitting encapsulation of
the neutral application principle that was alluded to in Nyquist and
formally declared in Widmar.
Unlike the assistance at issue in Nyquist, [Minnesota law] permits all par-
ents-whether their children attend public school or private-to deduct their
children's educational expenses. As Widmar and our other decisions indicate,
a program ... that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of
citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause.1 0 8
When subjected to a Lemon analysis, the Court held the neutral
application of government benefits in Widmar and Mueller did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion.109 Zobrest relied upon
this same logic with regard to the sign language interpreter furnished
in accordance with IDEA. Because a sign language interpreter is one
of many government services supplied under IDEA to all handicapped
students, the primary effect is that handicapped elementary and sec-
ondary students receive an appropriate education. Therefore, even in
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1993).
104. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467 (1993) (emphasis
added).
105. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
106. Id. at 397.
107. Id. at 404.
108. Id. at 398-99.




terms of the Lemon test, Zobrest clears the hurdle of the primary effect
prong.
The principle of neutral application satisfies the primary effect
prong of Lemon and is wholly consistent with the mandates of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Government benefits available on a neutral basis
will withstand scrutiny under the Lemon test or any other Establish-
ment Clause formula. Therefore, Zobrest, as well as future Religion
Clause cases involving government aid to a broad class of citizens, will
be deemed compatible with the First Amendment even though "sectar-
ian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit""10
from the state.
C. Private Choices Made by the Recipients of Government
Benefits Are Consistent with the Establishment
Clause
When the parents of James- Zobrest elected to send their son to
Salpointe Catholic High School, little did they realize that their pri-
vate choice would foment a five-year legal nightmare.Ii t Though in
the eyes of the Supreme Court, private choices of individuals that re-
sult in indirect government assistance to sectarian schools are harmo-
nious with the First Amendment.112 Nowhere is this proposition more
manifest than in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind."13
In Witters, the Supreme Court unanimously held the Establish-
ment Clause did not preclude Washington from providing educational
assistance to a blind student who attended a Christian college.114
Critical to the Court's inquiry was whether the direct financial aid
given to Larry Witters, which he then used to fund his Christian edu-
cation, was permissible under the First Amendment. The Court rea-
soned that although government aid was disseminated to a Christian
school, the conduit for the aid was the private choice of the benefici-
ary."15 Equally important to the Court's analysis was the fact that in
cases where government assistance does secondarily benefit a reli-
gious institution through the private choices of individuals, such
assistance cannot be characterized as state action."l 6 Justice Mar-
shall correctly articulated this point which applies a priori to Zobrest
as well.
110. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993).
111. See id. at 2464 n.3.
112. Id. at 2467.
113. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
114. Id.




Any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to reli-
gious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients.... Aid recipients' choices are made among a
huge variety of possible careers of which only a small handful are sectarian.
In this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to
support religious education is made by the individual, not by the State.
1 1 7
Fundamentally, Zobrest involved the private choices of parents,
rather than an impermissible state subsidy to a Catholic high school.
Like Witters, and the tax credits provided to parents in Mueller, the
decision of the Zobrests to seek a government benefit for their son
could hardly be characterized as a subterfuge designed to funnel gov-
ernment money to religion. For just as the government cannot pro-
hibit an unemployed worker from using his unemployment check to
give a tithe, it would be ludicrous to require the Zobrests to pledge not
to send James to Salpointe as a condition precedent to the government
providing him a sign langauge interpreter. If James Zobrest had
elected to attend a public school or even a private nonsectarian school,
he still would need the services of a sign language interpreter. As the
Court correctly recognized, before any financial benefit could possibly
reach Salpointe, an intermediate step had to occur.-1 8 It was the pri-
vate choice of the Zobrests, and not the public mandates of Congress,
that sent a government-paid sign language interpreter to assist James
Zobrest.
D. The Indirect Government Assistance to Salpointe Would
Not Result in a Direct Benefit to Religion
The principle argument proposed in Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Zobrest is that the Establishment Clause does not enable a "public
employee to participate directly in religious indoctrination.""19 Black-
mun contends the sign language interpreter provided to James
Zobrest is a form of direct aid and a "resource capable of advancing
[Salpointe's] religious mission."'12 0 Accordingly, any government ac-
tion that results in the conveyance of a religious message is ipso facto
a violation of the Establishment Clause.121 To support this conten-
tion, the dissent relies on Grand Rapids School District v. Ball122 and
117. Id. (emphasis added). Analytically, Justice Marshall reversed his position in Wit-
ters nearly 180 degrees from his dissent in Mueller three years before. In Muel-
ler, Marshall wrote, "[alny... benefit, including the tax deduction at issue here,
which subsidizes tuition payments to sectarian schools" is forbidden by the Es-
tablishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983).
118. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467-68 (1993). In
this case, the intermediate step was the decision of the Zobrests to send their son
to Salpointe.
119. Id. at 2471.
120. Id. at 2473.
121. See id. at 2474.
122. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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to a lesser extent Meek v. Pittenger,'23 two cases in which the
Supreme Court invalidated government programs that provided a di-
rect economic benefit to religious schools.
Ball involved two government-funded educational programs
adopted by the city of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Specifically, the
"Shared Time" program in Ball consisted of remedial education
courses offered to students on the premises of various private schools,
of which the vast majority were sectarian.' 24 And although the city of
Grand Rapids attempted to categorize the students in the program as
"part-time public school students,"1 25 it was readily apparent the
"Shared Time" program was a government-funded enterprise designed
to aid religious schools. In determining "Shared Time" and a related
program entitled "Community Education" constituted a violation of
the Establishment Clause, the Court concluded the programs in ques-
tion were a form of direct aid not "indistinguishable from the provision
of a direct cash subsidy."126 This "direct aid" analysis in Ball had its
genesis in Meek v. Piitenger,'27 a case in which the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania program that, like Ball, pro-
vided a plenitude of government assistance to religious schools.12s
Benefits in the form of textbooks, instructional materials, and diag-
nostic services were unambiguously characterized as "massive aid"
which are "neither indirect nor incidental."'2 9 Thus, the key factor in
Ball and Meek, upon which the dissent in Zobrest relies, is the concept
of "direct aid" to a sectarian school of "any resource capable of advanc-
ing [the] school's religious mission."' 30
Of course, the majority opinion in Zobrest roundly rejects the no-
tion that the presence of a sign language interpreter at Salpointe
would be analogous to giving direct aid to a religious school.'3' As
Justice Rehnquist's answer to the dissent's "direct aid" musings dem-
onstrates, at the very most Salpointe could only expect an "attenuated
financial benefit."'132 Specifically, the problematic nature of Justice
Blackmun's argument is his misguided reliance on Meek and Ball.'33
123. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
124. Forty of the forty-one schools participating in the program were sectarian in na-
ture. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384 (1985).
125. Id. at 378.
126. Id. at 395.
127. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
128. Id. at 351-55.
129. Id. at 365. Despite the constitutional setback for religious schools in Meek, Jus-
tice Powell does conjecture that a "class of general welfare services for children
•.. may be provided by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues
to church-related schools." Id. at 371 n.21 (emphasis added).
130. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2473 (1993).
131. Id. at 2468-69.
132. Id. at 2469.
133. Id. at 2468.
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Because the "direct" government assistance in Meek and Ball, "re-
lieved [the] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne
in educating their students,"'134 the aid given was properly character-
ized by the Court as the functional equivalent of a "direct cash sub-
sidy."'35 A sign language interpreter is a different story altogether,
"[f]or Salpointe is not relieved of an expense that it otherwise would
have assumed in educating [James Zobrest]."136 For instance, if
Salpointe had regularly provided sign language interpreters to all
deaf students, then a state-provided interpreter would have definitely
alleviated a financial burden on the school. However, this was cer-
tainly not the case, as the Zobrests ultimately expended $28,000 to
pay for James' sign language interpreter.137 The only conceivable eco-
nomic benefit Salpointe would realize from a state-paid interpreter is
from James Zobrest's tuition-"assunming [Salpointe] makes a
profit."138 Presuming that parents of handicapped children consider
the option of a religious education knowing the government will pro-
vide related educational services under IDEA, a claim that religious
schools will undergo a financial boon is at best problematic. Certainly
the direct-indirect aid dichotomy may at times be subject to differing
interpretations, 3 9 but even the dissent in Zobrest concedes "[t]hese
distinctions perhaps are somewhat fine, but lines must be drawn."140
The majority articulates a second and equally important flaw in
the dissent's reasoning. The facts of Zobrest suggest an inherent dis-
similarity between a teacher and a sign language interpreter. In this
respect, Meek and Ball are fundamentally different from Zobrest.141
Where a teacher may be required to present materials in such a way
as to reflect a religious world view, a sign language interpreter has
limited discretion in the actual translation of information. As the
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 395 (1985)).
136. Id. at 2469.
137. See Joan Biskupic, Court Alters Church-State Boundary; Tax Paid Interpreter
May Assist Deaf Pupil In Religious School, WASH. PosT, June 19, 1993, at Al.
138. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2468 (1993).
139. In a definitional sense, the Catalina Foothills School District is willing to accept
indirect aid to Salpointe, but only on its own terms. For instance they "readily
admit[ ] ... there would be no problem under the Establishment Clause if the
IDEA funds went directly to James' parents, who, in turn hired the interpreter
themselves." Id. at 2469 n.11. It would be interesting to inquire as to the dis-
trict's view on the constitutionality of educational vouchers, since under a
voucher program money is given first to the parents and then to a religious
school, much like the hypothetical situation the district endorsed in Zobrest.
140. Id. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985)).
141. Id. at 2469.
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Court stated, "ethical guidelines require interpreters to 'transmit
everything that is said in exactly the same way it was intended.'-142
V. CONCLUSIONS OF ZOBREST
In a technical sense, Zobrest does not signal a wholesale retreat
from the secularist jurisprudence that has plagued the Religion
Clauses for the last fifty years. And with the departure of Justice
White and the addition of Justice Ginsburg to the High Court, it
would not be surprising if the next Establishment Clause case turns
on a full scale application of the Lemon test.143 Instead, non-preferen-
tialists and religions majoritarians should view Zobrest as a tactical
victory rather than a strategic one. For in addition to vindicating one
family's right to government welfare benefits, Zobrest underscores two
axiomatic principles of Establishment Clause theory as related to the
modern welfare state. First, government programs neutrally avail-
able to a broad class of citizens are not violative of the Establishment
Clause, despite having the ancillary effect of aiding religion. And sec-
ond, in cases where religion derives an indirect benefit from a govern-
ment welfare program as a result of the private choices of individuals,
such indirect assistance is constitutionally permissible.
VI. ZOBREST, VOUCHERS, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
As the political battles rage between proponents of education
vouchers and the public education establishment, a new front may
soon open in the courtrooms of America. Opponents of education re-
form and tuition vouchers are relying on the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment to insulate them from political gains won by ed-
ucational reformers.144 However, in view of the Supreme Court's re-
142. Id. In Justice Blackmun's world, "government crosses the boundary [imposed by
the Establishment Clause] when it furnishes the medium for communication of a
religious message." Id. at 2474. To Sandra Zobrest, James' mother, this argu-
ment is no more than tortured logic. "'An interpreter is like a hearing aid-con-
veying information, not initiating it,' she says. 'If government pays for a hearing
aid, does that mean the hearing aid can't be used to listen to a church service?'"
Tony Mauro, Interpreter Subsidy at Heart of Case, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 1992, at
2A
143. Ruth Bader Ginsburg endorsed the Lemon Test during her confirmation hearings.
Joan Biskupic, School District Raises Church-State Question, THE WASH. PosT,
Nov. 30, 1993, at A16..
144. The rhetoric of voucher opponents habitually includes broad references to the
First Amendment, as illustrated in an article appearing in the Los Angeles Times
by the Executive Director of the ACLU's Southern California Chapter. "[Tihis
measure would make a mockery of the First Amendment guarantees of separa-
tion of church and state. Voucher schools could commingle religious dogma with
academics, at taxpayer expense. It would be truly government sponsorship of the
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cent decision in Zobrest, anti-voucher groups may find the "wall of
separation between church and state" insufficiently high enough to
protect them from defeat.
In November of 1993, the voters of California convincingly rejected
the Parental Choice in Education Amendment,l45 more commonly
known as Proposition 174. As a proposed amendment to the Califor-
nia Constitution, Proposition 174 would have enabled parents "to
choose any school, public or private, for the education of their chil-
dren."14 6 Unlike other voucher programs that are limited to private
nonsectarian schools,147 the California voucher plan was novel in that
it did not exclude religious schools from full participation.14 And
although the electorate in California may not be ready to embrace
vouchers as a matter of public policy, it would be premature to think
the school choice movement is going to quietly disappear from the
political landscape. For this reason, the public policy debate over
vouchers continues, and legal questions remain whether future
voucher proposals, which permit parents to send their children to reli-
gious schools, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment.l4 9 Analyzing the structural composition of California's
Proposition 174 in terms of Zobrest will help provide the answer.
In the domain of government welfare programs, Zobrest confirmed
two fundamental legal principles. First, "government programs that
neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment
Clause challenge ... ."15o Second, when "public funds become avail-
teachings of a particular religion." Ramona Ripston, A Measure Built on a Foun-
dation of Lies, L.A. Tums, Sept. 7, 1993, at 5B.
145. California Ballot Proposition 174, The Parental Choice in Education Amendment
of 1993 [hereinafter Proposition 174].
146. Id. § 17.
147. The much publicized Milwaukee Plan was a pyrrhic victory for voucher purists.
Only one percent of all students enrolled in the Milwaukee public schools are able
to participate in the program, and parents are prohibited from using vouchers at
sectarian schools. Interestingly, the exclusion of religious schools has prompted a
federal lawsuit from parents that are now claiming the program violates their
free exercise rights under the First Amendment. If the suit is successful, pro-
spective voucher programs may be required by the Constitution to include reli-
gious schools. Daniel McGroarty, A Prayer for a Better Education, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 1993, at A10.
148. See Proposition 174 supra note 145, § 17(d).
149. State constitutions may pose additional problems for voucher advocates. For ex-
ample, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has interpreted article 46, section 2 of
the Massachusetts Constitution to prohibit any public funds or state aid to reli-
gious institutions, including religious schools. See Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353 (Mass. 1987). Thus, in order to construct a voucher pro-
gram in states having constitutions that expressly forbid aid to sectarian schools,
a state constitutional amendment would be necessary-certainly a more hercu-
lean task than a simple legislative enactment.
150. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993).
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able to sectarian schools . . . 'as a result of the numerous private
choices of individual parents of school-age children,"'"- such aid is
constitutionally permissible. The relevant provisions of the Parental
Choice In Education Amendment fit neatly within the constitutional
requirements announced in Zobrest. Section 17 of the amendment
provides in part:
THEREFORE: All parents are hereby empowered to choose any school, pub-
lic or private, for the education of their children, as provided in this Section.
(a) Empowerment of Parents; Granting of scholarships. The State shall
annually provide a scholarship to every resident school-age child. Scholarships
may be redeemed by the child's parent at any scholarship-redeeming school.
(d) DEFINIONS.
(2) A "child" is an individual eligible to attend kindergarten or grades
one through twelve in the public school system.
(7) A "scholarship-redeeming school" is any school public or private,
located within California which meets the requirements of this Section.
No school shall be compelled to become a scholarship-redeeming
school. No school which meets the requirements of this Section shall
be prevented from becoming a scholarship redeeming school. 152
If the neutral application of benefits across a broad spectrum of indi-
viduals is the prerequisite for surviving an Establishment Clause
challenge, then California's Proposition 174 and other similarly con-
structed voucher proposals will pass the test. As the language of the
amendment clearly indicates, all children, all parents, and all schools
are eligible to participate.' 5 3 Furthermore, the amendment does not
define the class of beneficiaries in terms of religious preferences and
"is in no way skewed towards religion."'154 Because participation in
the voucher program is not obligatory, some religious or private non-
sectarian schools may even decide not to take part.55
Section 17(a)(4) of Proposition 174 concerns the decisionmaking
process whereby aid is disbursed to the school.
(4) Scholarships provided ... are grants of aid to children through their par-
ents and not to the schools in which the children are enrolled.... The parent
shall be free to choose any scholarship-redeeming school, and such selection
shall not constitute a decision or act of the State .... 356
This provision is certainly consistent with the private choice require-
ment articulated in Zobrest, yet it is interesting to note that section
17(a)(4) attempts to characterize the funding as direct aid to the par-
151. Id. at 2467 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)).
152. Proposition 174 supra note 145, §§ 17(a)-17(d)(7).
153. Id.
154. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 479, 488 (1986).
155. See Proposition 174 supra note 145, § 17(d)(7).
156. Id. § 17(a)(4)(emphasis added).
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ents and "not to the school."157 However, a subsequent provision of the
amendment seems to indicate a more linear relationship between gov-
ernment funds and the coffers of private schools:
After the parent designates the enrolling school, the State shall disburse the
student's scholarship funds . .. in equal amounts monthly, directly to the
school for credit to the parents account.15 8
The subtle conflict between these two provision again raises the spec-
ter of the direct-indirect aid dichotomy manifested in Zobrest. Oppo-
nents of vouchers will presumably argue that voucher schemes
patterned after Proposition 174 are analogous to the programs struck
down in Ball, while voucher advocates will assert that such plans are
more similar to the scholarship program upheld in Witters. However
upon closer examination, California's proposed voucher system was
fundamentally different from Ball in several aspects. First, the pro-
grams in Ball were narrowly tailored to specifically benefit a limited
number of sectarian schools.' 5 9 The California plan on the other
hand, was a broad-based proposal where a hypothetical scenario can
be envisioned in which no religious schools participate in the program
and thereby receive no government funds.160 Even the Court in Ball
recognized, "[this] Court has never accepted the mere possibility of
subsidization... as sufficient to invalidate an aid program."' 61 Sec-
ondly, like the sign language interpreter in Zobrest and the scholar-
ship money in Witters, state aid under voucher plans modeled after
Proposition 174 will not flow to a religious school until the parents
first decide to send their children to a particular school. In Ball how-
ever, the state funds flowed directly to the religious school independ-
ent of any prior decisionmaking process initiated by parents or school
administrators. Admittedly, this difference is a matter of degree, but
as Justice Brennan observed in Ball, "[t]he problem like many
problems in constitutional law, is one of degree."162
Another factor articulated in Zobrest militating in favor of the con-
stitutionality of vouchers is the fact that religious schools will not be
"relieved of expenses [they] otherwise would have assumed in educat-
ing [their] students."163 In Zobrest, Salpointe would not have in-
curred the expense of a sign language interpreter and when one was
provided, albeit from the Zobrests, the resulting financial effect on the
school was negligible. Likewise, if Proposition 174 had been success-
ful, religious schools would not have received a massive influx of gov-
157. See id.
158. See id. § 17(b)(7)(emphasis added).
159. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985).
162. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
163. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993).
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ernment funds to supplement their own costs of educating children.164
For in the absence of the tuition vouchers, religious schools would not
have incurred the expense of providing a free education to students.
In this sense, Proposition 174 and Zobrest are analytically similar,
and when the inevitable legal challenges to the constitutionality of
vouchers occur, Zobrest will no doubt be dispositive of the legal issues
involved.
Beyond the heated. rhetoric of the voucher debate, the final resolu-
tion of the constitutional issues surrounding voucher proposals simi-
lar to California's Parental Choice in Education Amendment will
certainly have profound implications for the success of education re-
form. And with the Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest, educational
statists must be concerned. Their hackneyed legal claims that the
First Amendment absolutely prohibits government aid to religious
schools is losing legal credibility. As Harvard law professor Laurence
Tribe, not usually known as a friend of conservative causes, recently
commented: "Given the existing doctrine about the separation of
church and state, I do not see a serious First Amendment problem
with a reasonably written voucher program."16 5 Nevertheless,
voucher proponents would be wise not to discount the inherent risk
associated with allowing government a foothold into the arena of pri-
vate education. Aside from the apparent constitutionality of vouchers,
religious schools and private education in general must consider the
ominous possibility of increased government regulation that must in-
evitably accompany the funding of private schools with public money.
Given the government's propensity to contaminate a good idea, it may
be prudential for religious schools to live with the devil they do know,
instead of the one they don't.
Kirk A Kennedy '95
164. But see Proposition 174, supra note 145, § 17(a)(5). Proposition 174 had a phase-
in period for students currently attending private schools. Parents of these stu-
dents would not be eligible to receive vouchers until the 1995-1996 school year.
While it may initially appear that private schools would eventually be relieved of
the tuition costs of students currently enrolled, this view is analytically unsatis-
fying. Private schools would still receive the same amount of money for tuition,
but the source may be slightly altered, as parents will now pay for the tuition
with a voucher instead of cash.
165. Walter Shapiro, Tough Choice, TDAE, Sept. 16, 1991, at 54.
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